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A Call for an Interpretive Presumption Against 
Burdens on Interstate Commerce in the Context of 
Interstate Compacts 
INTRODUCTION 
Everything’s hotter in Texas. In fact, due to the intense Texas 
heat and the devastating lack of rain, 2006 marked one of Texas’s 
worst droughts in 50 years.1 Drought-related crop and livestock 
losses totaled $4.1 billion and about one-third of Texas’s 6.4 
million planted acres were abandoned due to lack of rain.2  
In 2007, faced with a drought and a dwindling water supply, 
Tarrant Regional Water District, a Texas agency responsible for 
providing water to over 1.6 million people in north-central Texas, 
felt the heat.3 The agency turned to its northern neighbor, 
Oklahoma, for some of its Red River water supply. In its 
application to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Tarrant 
requested 460,000 acre-feet of water per year, or about 411 million 
gallons a day.4 Of course, Texas planned to pay Oklahoma for its 
water; such an agreement would likely have carried a price tag of 
tens of millions of dollars.5  
In contrast to thirsty Texas, Oklahoma’s water supply satisfies 
the state’s own needs more than adequately: in 2008, Oklahoma 
had 3.6 million residents, but enough water for 21 million people.6 
Statistics show that Oklahoma could easily have stepped in to sate 
Texas’s thirst: Oklahoma has eight times the amount of water that 
North Texans needed to make up annual shortages that are slated 
to occur in the next 50 years.7 
Nevertheless, Oklahoma gave its neighbor-in-need the cold 
shoulder.8 Over a decade ago, the Oklahoma legislature considered 
proposals to pump billions of gallons of water out of the Red River 
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 1. Summer of Despair: Drought is especially tough on Texas farmers, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 23, 2006, at 16A. 
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 3. Tony Thornton, North Texas water district sues over state moratorium: 
Interstate commerce violation alleged in federal court action, THE DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 12, 2007, at 13A.  
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 5. Eric Aasen, Parched Texas looks to Oklahoma for water: Despite 
pressure from N. Texas, Oklahoma’s not ready to sell sources, THE DALLAS 
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Basin to sell to Texas to alleviate a drought devastating the Dallas-
Fort Worth area.9 The idea was put to rest, however, in 2002 when 
Oklahoma instituted a moratorium on out-of-state water transfers.10 
The moratorium persists today, after the Oklahoma legislature 
voted to renew the measure in 2009.11 Oklahoma’s resistance to 
sharing its water with Texas may stem from the longstanding 
Sooner-Longhorn football rivalry, but Oklahomans insist it is 
simply an exercise of state sovereignty.12 While Texas officials 
have persuasively argued that the water deal would be as beneficial 
to Oklahoma as it is to Texas, Oklahomans have staunchly 
disapproved of the out-of-state water sharing.13 Although it is easy 
to criticize Oklahoma’s choice to deny Texas’s application on the 
premise that its refusal is impolite, as a legal matter, the question 
becomes whether Tarrant had any legally enforceable right to the 
water.  
Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana are parties to the 
Red River Compact, an agreement allocating the Red River water 
supply among the member states.14 The compact, approved by 
Congress in 1980, grants the states “equal rights to the use and 
runoff” of undesignated water that flows in the particular sub-basin 
of Tarrant’s request, but only if flows in Louisiana and Arkansas 
reach a certain threshold.15 The compact further dictates that no 
state is entitled to more than 25% of the water located within the 
sub-basin.16 Tarrant, believing this language to guarantee each 
state 25% of the water, sued Oklahoma for declining to share with 
them what Texas considers its equal share of the sub-basin water.17 
The lawsuit, instituted in 2007, made its way through the federal 
courts, with Oklahoma defeating Tarrant each level.18 
                                                                                                             
 9. Jim Malewitz, Red River showdown: Texas-Oklahoma water war could 
reverberate across U.S., STATELINE.ORG (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.pewstates 
.org/projects/stateline/headlines/red-river-showdown-texas-oklahoma-water-war 
-could-reverberate-across-us-85899470724, archived at http://perma.cc/AYW6-
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 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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 13. Id. 
 14. See Red River Compact, congressional consent., Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 
Stat. 3305 (1980). 
 15. Malewitz, supra note 9. 
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 18. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 
(2013). 
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The case, Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann,19 
raised several pressing issues. Namely, the dispute highlighted the 
difficulties the United States faces as a result of climate change 
and the depletion of natural resources.20 Oklahoma, in exercising 
its state sovereignty, successfully staved off Texas’s attempts to 
purchase Oklahoma’s abundant supply of water.21 This raised the 
question: state sovereignty is a fundamental, defining characteristic 
of our governmental structure, but at what cost?  
This is where two important areas of constitutional law—and 
the troubled relationship between them—come into play. 
Authorized under Article I, Section 10 of the United States 
Constitution, states may enter into agreements with each other with 
the approval of Congress.22 The slim text of the provision has left 
much to be determined by the courts, but it is clear that states may 
not burden interstate commerce pursuant to an interstate compact 
unless Congress has given the compact its blessing.23 Tarrant 
unsuccessfully argued that Oklahoma’s moratorium on exporting 
its water beyond state lines was tantamount to an unconstitutional 
burden on interstate commerce.24 
This Comment proposes a solution to the issues surrounding 
the scope of congressional consent to interstate compacts affecting 
interstate commerce. Part I presents the relevant legal background 
necessary to understand the issues implicated where the Compact 
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause intersect. Part II 
examines case law dealing with congressional consent granted 
pursuant to both the Compact Clause and Commerce Clause, 
including a discussion of the Tarrant case. Part III provides a 
solution to the issues raised in Tarrant: an interpretive presumption 
against burdens on interstate commerce. Finally, Part IV 
demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed solution by applying 
the presumption to the Tarrant case and explaining how the 
interpretive presumption would produce a more desirable result.  
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Interstate compacts created under the United States 
Constitution provide a mechanism for formal interstate cooperation 
                                                                                                             
 19. 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013). 
 20. See id. at 2128.  
 21. See id. at 2137. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2128–29 
(2013). 
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upon approval from Congress.25 These compacts are negotiated 
and implemented by states and serve as a valuable means for the 
resolution of regional issues.26 But just as the Compact Clause has 
been an efficient vehicle for states to resolve regional issues, some 
regulations are not properly made by states. Under the dormant 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, states are not permitted to 
burden interstate commerce without the consent of Congress.27 
Thus, when states enter into compacts that may ultimately create 
barriers to interstate commerce, the question arises as to whether 
Congress contemplated and approved such consequences, or 
whether Congress simply agreed to allow the states to enter the 
compact without considering its ramifications relative to the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  
A. The Compact Clause 
The compact is the oldest known mechanism used to achieve 
formal interstate collaboration.28 The origins of the modern 
Compact Clause are rooted in colonial history.29 Prior to the 
establishment of the United States, boundary disputes demanded 
significant attention of colonial officials and the Crown, requiring 
significant intercolonial cooperation.30 These early methods of 
resolution are likely the basis of the interstate dispute resolution 
written into the Articles of Confederation: “No two or more states 
shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever 
between them, without the consent of the united states in congress 
assembled, specifying accurately the purpose for which the same is 
to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.”31 The success 
of these early interstate agreements and the prevalence of boundary 
disputes in 1787 prompted the drafters of the Constitution to 
include a similar provision for interstate cooperation.32  
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, the Compact Clause, 
provides, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . 
                                                                                                             
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 26. Matthew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts Require 
Congressional Consent?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 519 (2009). 
 27. See Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 28. CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 3 (2006). 
 29. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the 
Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 692 (1925).  
 30. BROUN, supra note 28, at 4–5. 
 31. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 2. 
 32. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION 41 (2d ed. 2012).  
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enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . ”33 
Today, Congress has approved about 200 interstate compacts.34 
Compacts cover a broad range of issues, including water allocation 
and conservation, low-level radioactive waste disposal, crime 
control, education, and child welfare.35 As of 2009, 37 compacts36 
attempt to resolve water allocation issues between states.37 
According to the Supreme Court in New York v. New Jersey, 38 
interstate water conflicts, in particular, are disputes “more likely to 
be wisely solved by cooperative study and by conference and 
mutual concession on the part of the representatives of the States 
so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court however 
constituted.”39  
Although the Compact Clause prohibits states from entering 
into agreements with each other without the consent of Congress, 
the Supreme Court has held that not all interstate agreements 
require congressional consent.40 In Virginia v. Tennessee, the 
Court interpreted the Compact Clause as applying to those 
agreements facilitating the “formation of any combination tending 
to the increase of political power in the states, which may encroach 
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”41 
In its analysis, the Court recognized “there are many matters upon 
which different states may agree that can in no respect concern the 
United States.”42 In dicta, Justice Field provided several examples 
of state agreements that would not encroach upon the supremacy of 
the federal government.43 
The Supreme Court affirmed and expounded upon the Virginia 
v. Tennessee holding in its 1978 decision United States Steel 
Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission,44 deciding that the 
                                                                                                             
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 34. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 32, at 237–49. 
 35. Pincus, supra note 26, at 519. 
 36. Id. 
 37. GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF 
INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2000). 
 38. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).  
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518–19 (1893); New 
Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976). 
 41. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.  
 42. Id. at 518. 
 43. One example is as follows: “If Massachusetts, in forwarding its exhibits 
to the World’s Fair at Chicago, should desire to transport them a part of the 
distance over the Erie Canal, it would hardly be deemed essential for that State 
to obtain the consent of Congress before it could contract with New York for the 
transportation of the exhibits through that State in that way.” Id. 
 44. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).  
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Virginia v. Tennessee rule “states the proper balance between 
federal and state power with respect to compacts and agreements 
among States.”45 In United States Steel, the Court sought to 
determine whether the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) was 
unconstitutional as an unapproved interstate compact.46 In 
determining whether the compact “enhance[d] state power quoad47 
the national government,”48 the Court described the proper analysis 
as one focused upon the “potential, rather than actual, impact upon 
federal supremacy.”49  
Although some interstate agreements require congressional 
consent, the Constitution does not state when Congress must give 
its consent, whether the consent should follow or precede the 
compact, or whether the consent should be express or implied.50 
With respect to the proper timing of consent, traditional practice 
indicates that consent is granted in one of three ways.  
First, consent may be given explicitly, upon submission of the 
compact by member states for Congress’s approval.51 For instance, 
in 2008, Congress passed an act granting its approval of the Great 
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact 
between Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.52 The preamble of the Act 
characterizes Congress’s enactment as a “Joint Resolution 
Expressing the consent and approval of Congress to an interstate 
compact regarding water resources in the Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence River Basin. . . . [w]hereas the interstate compact 
regarding water resources in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River 
Basin reads as follows: . . . ” The language of the Compact is 
imported into the Act, clearly delineated by quotation marks. 
Following the language of the Compact itself, the Act provides as 
follows: “Congress consents to and approves the interstate compact 
regarding water resources in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. at 471. 
 46. Id. at 454. 
 47. As regards; with regard to. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 48. 434 U.S. at 494. 
 49. Id. at 472. In finding that the MTC did not require congressional 
consent, somewhat contradictorily, the Court looked only to the actual impacts 
upon federal supremacy. Because the MTC did not authorize the states to 
exercise any powers it could not exercise in the absence of the Compact, 
congressional consent was not required. 
 50. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893). 
 51. BROUN, supra note 28, at 36. 
 52. See Great Lakes—St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008).  
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Basin described in the preamble . . . ”53 This language is typical of 
back-end congressional approval.54 
Second, Congress may grant its consent broadly in advance by 
adopting legislation encouraging states to enter into interstate 
compacts.55 For example, in 1980, Congress granted its consent in 
advance for regional waste compacts.56 In part, the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act57 provides:  
It is the policy of the Federal Government that the 
responsibilities of the States . . . for the disposal of low-
level radioactive waste can be most safely and effectively 
managed on a regional basis. To carry out [this] policy . . . 
the States may enter into such compacts as may be 
necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of 
the regional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive 
waste . . . .58  
The Act further conditions its advanced consent, explaining that 
the Act neither diminishes the applicability of any federal laws nor 
affects any state laws.59  
Although there are inherent drawbacks to the advanced consent 
method, it is an entirely appropriate way for Congress to approve 
an interstate compact. It is certainly a suitable exercise of federal 
structure for Congress to participate in the advanced consent 
practice by calling for states to enter into interstate compacts to 
resolve an issue deemed by Congress as fit for state regulation. 
One scholar characterized the realm of interstate compact 
regulation as “supra-state, sub-federal,”60 meaning that the matters 
covered by interstate compacts are clearly beyond the realm of 
individual state authority but may not be within the purview of the 
federal government due to regional content. Accordingly, 
Congress’s willingness to invite and encourage state negotiation 
and resolution in areas of regional concern is a useful and 
appropriate exercise of Congress’s power to approve interstate 
compacts. However, issues arise when advanced consent is broad 
and uncertain. When that is the case, it is sometimes difficult to 
ascertain the scope of consent that Congress has given. 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. 
 54. BROUN, supra note 28, at 37. 
 55. Id. at 37. 
 56. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 32, at 243. 
 57. 42 U.S.C. §2021d (1980). 
 58. Id. at §2021d(a)(1–2). 
 59. Id. at §2021d(b)(3, 5). 
 60. See BROUN, supra note 28, at 1. 
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The advanced consent method has various advantages. For 
instance, without the advanced go-ahead from Congress, states 
may be unwilling to enter into negotiations, due to the risk that 
Congress will withhold its consent. Congressional consent to 
compacts is a gratuity on the part of Congress, not a right that the 
states possess61 and states may rationally decline to invest large 
upfront negotiating costs if there is no guarantee that Congress will 
sign off on the fruits of their efforts. Moreover, because the 
compacting process can take years—even decades in some cases—
states may be more willing to enter into these drawn-out 
compacting negotiations if Congress has provided guideposts that 
can lead them to form an agreement to which Congress will grant 
its consent.62 
Last, consent may be implied through congressional 
acquiescence to an interstate compact.63 In Virginia v. Tennessee, 
the Supreme Court decided that Congress impliedly consented to 
the boundary compact between the two states.64 Virginia v. 
Tennessee’s most significant takeaway, perhaps, is the Court’s 
holding that congressional acquiescence can be implied from 
“subsequent legislation and proceedings.”65 The Court held that 
Congress had implicitly approved the boundary line due to its use 
of the boundary in resolving “judicial and revenue” issues in the 
two states.66  
Congress may also impose conditions to its consent;67 Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes noted in 1937, “It can hardly be 
doubted that in giving consent Congress may impose conditions.”68 
Such conditions are often tacked on to the end of a piece of 
congressional legislation approving an interstate compact; 
Congress often reserves its right to “alter, amend, or repeal” 
consent.69 Although conditional language is often attached in this 
boilerplate form, Congress has attached specific conditions to 
some compacts.70 
                                                                                                             
 61. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999). 
 62. For instance, negotiations between Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and 
Texas persisted for over twenty years before the Red River Compact was 
completed. Malewitz, supra note 9. 
 63. BROUN, supra note 28, at 38. 
 64. 148 U.S. 503, 522 (1893). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 32, at 55. 
 68. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937).  
 69. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 32, at 50. 
 70. For instance, Congress conditioned its consent to the 1959 Wabash 
Valley Compact and the 1960 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
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Once Congress consents to an interstate compact, it becomes 
federal law.71 Compacts are typically enacted into state law using 
the precise language of the compact.72 Although some states enact 
this enabling legislation to execute interstate compacts, one 
authority suggests such legislation is not required.73  
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that Congress 
has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”74 Under the 
Commerce Clause power, Congress is empowered to regulate the 
following: the use of channels of interstate commerce; the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce; and those activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.75 Thus, the scope of 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is quite broad.  
Although on its face the Commerce Clause seems to provide 
Congress with only an affirmative power to regulate commerce, 
the Commerce Clause has been interpreted to carry with it an 
implicit restriction on state interference with interstate 
commerce.76 To determine whether a state regulation violates this 
“dormant,” or “negative,” aspect of the Commerce Clause, a court 
must first ask whether the regulation discriminates, on its face, 
against interstate commerce.77 A law discriminates against 
interstate commerce if the regulation favors in-state economic 
interests and burdens out-of-state interests.78 The Supreme Court 
has set out a two-tiered approach to determine whether a state 
regulation violates the dormant Commerce Clause.79 A reviewing 
court must first ascertain whether the regulation discriminates 
                                                                                                             
 
Regulation Compact with the requirement each compact commission must 
publish specified data and information. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 32, at 55. 
 71. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564–65 (1983).  
 72. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 32, at 50. 
 73. See General Expressways, Inc. v. Iowa Reciprocity Bd., 163 N.W.2d 
413, 419 (1968). 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 75. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 76. See United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007).  
 77. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Amy M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 
57 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1994).  
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against interstate commerce on its face.80 If it does, the regulation 
is per se invalid, unless the state can demonstrate a compelling 
state interest to justify the differential treatment.81 The second tier, 
derived from the 1970 seminal case Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,82 
provides that in the case of a facially neutral regulation, the court 
must examine potential discriminatory effects and weigh the 
incidental burdens on interstate commerce against the benefits to 
local interests under the regulation.83 According to Pike, a facially 
neutral regulation will be struck down when its discriminatory 
effects exceed any local benefits.84  
However, states are not entirely prohibited from regulating 
aspects of interstate commerce. Because Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce is plenary, it can authorize states to pass laws 
that interfere with interstate commerce.85 When Congress so 
chooses, approved state actions are invulnerable to constitutional 
attack under the Commerce Clause.86 Take, for instance, the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act as a clear example of congressional 
acquiescence to state regulation in an area of interstate 
commerce.87 The 1945 congressional Act provides: “Congress 
hereby declares the continued regulation . . . by the several States 
of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that 
silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose 
any barrier to the regulation . . . of such business by the several 
States.”88 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to 
unambiguously insulate a state’s regulation of insurance from 
Commerce Clause challenge.89  
The congressional acquiescence doctrine has come into play in 
the context of interstate agreements created under the Compact 
Clause. It does not take much imagination to conceive of an 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. See also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 
(1978).  
 82. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 83. Petragnani, supra note 79, at 1217. 
 84. 397 U.S. at 142. 
 85. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87–88 
(1984). 
 86. Northwest Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 
U.S. 159, 174 (1985).  
 87. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1945). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946) 
(“Obviously Congress’ purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and 
future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This 
was done in two ways. One was by removing obstructions which might be 
thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised . . . .”). 
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interstate agreement that may affect or burden interstate 
commerce. In the past, when the two issues have been raised 
together, courts have employed ambiguous standards to determine 
whether Congress’s consent of the states entering into the 
compacts impliedly demonstrates its consent to any possible 
dormant Commerce Clause violations that execution of the 
compact would entail. 
Courts have taken uncertain approaches in determining 
whether Congress has in fact granted its consent for a state to 
regulate in a way that would normally violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,90 the 
Supreme Court held that, in order to demonstrate Congress’s intent 
to allow states to burden interstate commerce, Congress’s “intent 
and policy”91 to protect the state legislation from attack under the 
Commerce Clause must be “expressly stated.”92 In South-Central 
Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Supreme Court held 
that an express statement is just one way Congress can manifest its 
intent to allow a state to burden interstate commerce.93 According 
to the Court, what matters is that Congress “affirmatively 
contemplate” that it is consenting to protectionism and that its 
intent is “unmistakably clear.”94 Moreover, in Wunnicke, the Court 
cautioned that state consistency with parallel federal policy is not 
enough to evince congressional acquiescence of such regulation.95 
In other words, a state cannot sustain a congressional acquiescence 
claim by demonstrating the policies underlying the state regulation 
are similar to those underlying parallel federal statutes.  
In Wunnicke, the Alaska regulation at hand involved 
restrictions on timber exportation.96 In striking down the regulation 
as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court rejected 
Alaska’s claim of congressional acquiescence based on the Alaska 
statute’s consistency with federal timber exportation policy.97 The 
Court explained, “Congress acted only with respect to federal 
lands; we cannot infer from that fact that it intended to authorize a 
similar policy with respect to state lands.”98 Thus, case law merely 
provides a mish-mash of meaningless phrases all tending to 
indicate that a state bringing the acquiescence claim must bring to 
                                                                                                             
 90. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
 91. Id. at 960. 
 92. Id. 
 93. South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984). 
 94. Id. at 91–92. 
 95. Id. at 92. 
 96. Id. at 84. 
 97. See id. at 91–92. 
 98. Id. at 92–93. 
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the court’s attention some concrete statement of Congress 
approving the regulation. 
As federal law, interstate compacts themselves are invulnerable 
to challenges under the dormant Commerce Clause.99 This 
principle is based on the idea that, because Congress has 
affirmatively approved the state regulation, Congress’s power over 
interstate commerce has been exercised, and thus does not lie 
dormant.100 However, as explained in the following section, this 
does not mean interstate compacts can never give rise to dormant 
Commerce Clause issues; on the contrary, the interaction of 
interstate compacts and state laws can implicate the dormant 
Commerce Clause, as it did in the Tarrant case. 
When an interstate compact seeks to regulate interstate 
commerce, the issue may arise as to whether Congress meant 
simply to allow the member states to enter into the compact, or 
whether Congress’s consent to the compact also implies 
Congress’s understanding that the compacting states could and 
would discriminate against interstate commerce in implementing 
the compact itself. This “double-consent” issue was raised in the 
recent Supreme Court case, Tarrant Regional Water District v. 
Herrmann.101 
II. TARRANT REGIONAL WATER DISTRICT V. HERRMANN 
The Red River Compact is a congressionally approved102 
interstate compact that allocates water rights within the Red River 
Basin among Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. Under 
the Compact’s own terms, its purposes include “governing the use, 
control, and distribution of the interstate water” and “to provide an 
equitable apportionment” of that water.103 Further, the Compact 
provides that nothing in the compact “shall be deemed to interfere 
with or impair the right or power of any Signatory State to regulate 
within its boundaries the appropriation, use, and control of water or 
                                                                                                             
 99. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 
568, 569–70 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 100. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210 (1824). 
 101. 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013).  
 102. See Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, § 1, 94 Stat. 3305, 3305 
(1980) (“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled . . . . The consent of Congress is 
hereby given to the Red River Compact among the States of Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, and Texas, of May 12, 1978, as ratified by the States . . . .”). 
 103. Id. at § 1.01(a), (b). 
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quality of water, not inconsistent with its obligations under this 
Compact.”104  
The Compact divides the Red River Basin into five “reaches,” 
and subsequently divides those reaches into subbasins.105 Tarrant, a 
Texas state agency, sought a water resource permit from the 
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) in an attempt to 
appropriate water located in reach II, subbasin 5 in southern 
Oklahoma.106 
Presumably, Tarrant knew Oklahoma would deny its request 
because Oklahoma’s water statutes effectively prevent any out-of-
state applicants from taking or diverting water from within 
Oklahoma’s borders.107 Once denied the permit, Tarrant filed suit 
to enjoin the enforcement of the Oklahoma water statutes, arguing 
that Oklahoma’s water allocation scheme was preempted by 
federal law and violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating 
against interstate commerce in water.108 Tarrant filed its suit within 
30 minutes of Oklahoma’s denial.109 
Oklahoma observes a strict moratorium on out-of-state water 
exportation.110 Additionally, the state has passed legislation 
demonstrating an explicit preference for in-state water users: 
“Water use within Oklahoma should be developed to the maximum 
extent feasible for the benefit of Oklahoma so that downstream 
out-of-state users will not acquire vested rights therein to the 
detriment of the citizens of this state.”111  
At the district court level, Tarrant argued that Oklahoma’s 
water statutes violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. at § 2.10(a). 
 105. Id. at § 2.12 , §§ 5–8. 
 106. Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2126. 
 107. Id. at 2128. See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1086.1(A)(3) (West 
2008) (“Water use within Oklahoma should be developed to the maximum 
extent feasible for the benefit of Oklahoma so that out-of-state downstream 
users will not acquire vested rights therein to the detriment of citizens of this 
state.”). 
 108. 133 S. Ct. at 2129. 
 109. Thornton, supra note 3. 
 110. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1B(A) (2004) (“In order to provide for the 
conservation, preservation, protection and optimum development and utilization 
of surface water and groundwater within Oklahoma, the Legislature hereby 
establishes a moratorium on the sale or exportation of surface water and/or 
groundwater outside this state pursuant to the provisions of this section.”). See 
also OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1B (1992) (“In order to provide for the conservation, 
preservation, protection and optimum development and utilization of surface 
water and groundwater within Oklahoma, the Legislature hereby establishes a 
moratorium on the sale or exportation of surface water and/or groundwater 
outside this state pursuant to the provisions of this section.”). 
 111. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1086.1(A)(3) (West 2008). 
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statutes grant Oklahoma residents a “preferred right of access, over 
out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its 
borders . . . ” in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.112 
Oklahoma argued that Congress’s ratification of the Red River 
Compact acted to authorize Oklahoma’s state limitations on its 
state water subject to the compact.113 The district court defined the 
relevant inquiry as a question of whether the Red River Compact is 
a “sufficiently clear” expression of Congressional intent to grant 
Oklahoma the ability to burden interstate commerce in a manner 
which would otherwise be impermissible under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.114 
In order to resolve the issue of whether Congress’s consent was 
“sufficiently clear” to demonstrate dormant Commerce Clause 
acquiescence, the court determined the question was one of 
“congressional intent.”115 Because the main purpose of the Red 
River Compact was to allocate resources, the district court found 
that the compact “necessarily”116constituted Congress’s consent to 
a “legal scheme different from that which would otherwise survive 
Commerce Clause scrutiny.”117 As a result, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Oklahoma.118 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals focused its analysis on the 
relationship between the Red River Compact and the Oklahoma 
water statutes in order to determine whether Congress intended to 
displace the limitations of the dormant Commerce Clause when 
approving the Red River Compact.119 The Tenth Circuit examined 
the language of the compact and found that because the compact’s 
terms recognized plenary state power to regulate water, Congress 
“conferred broad regulatory authority on the state using 
unqualified terms.”120 In particular, the court focused on section 
2.01 of the Red River Compact, which provides, in part: “Each 
Signatory State may use the water allocated to it by this Compact 
in any manner deemed beneficial by that state. Each state may 
freely administer water rights and uses in accordance with the laws 
                                                                                                             
 112. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No. CIV–07–0045–HE, 2009 
WL 3922803, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2009). 
 113. Id. at *4. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at *6. 
 117. Id. at *6.  
 118. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist., 2009 WL 3922803, at *8. 
 119. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
 120. Id. at 1237. 
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of that state.”121 Considering this language, and Congress’s 
comprehensive approval of the compact, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that Congress intended to allow the states to freely 
administer the water in any way each state deemed beneficial, and 
thus satisfied the Sporhase and Wunnicke standards.122 Moreover, 
the court cited section 2.10 as an express acknowledgement of 
state discretion over water allocation, focusing in particular on the 
following language: “Nothing in this Compact shall be deemed . . . 
to interfere within its boundaries the appropriation, use, and 
control of water.”123 The court considered section 2.10 to represent 
a reaffirmation of state control of water.124 The court ultimately 
concluded that Congress’s ratification of the Red River Compact 
represented its approval of Oklahoma’s moratorium.125 
The United States Supreme Court rejected Tarrant’s dormant 
Commerce Clause claim on different grounds.126 Instead of closely 
analyzing the expressions of purpose set out in the Red River 
Compact as the lower courts did, the Court focused on Tarrant’s 
characterization of the water to which Tarrant argued Texas had 
rights under the Compact.127 Tarrant argued that the Oklahoma 
statutes discriminated against interstate commerce by erecting 
barriers to the distribution of water “unallocated” under the 
compact.128 Because the Court held that, under the provisions of 
the Compact,129 no water was left “unallocated,” Tarrant’s claim 
could not prevail.130 The Court sidestepped the “double-consent” 
issue altogether.  
                                                                                                             
 121. Red River Compact, supra note 102, at § 2.01. 
 122. Tarrant, 656 F.3d at 1237.  
 123. Id. at 1237–38 (quoting Red River Compact § 2.01). 
 124. Id. at 1238. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2136–37 
(2013). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2137. 
 129. “Tarrant’s assumption that that [sic] the Compact leaves some water 
‘unallocated’ is incorrect . . . . [W]hen the River’s flow is above 3,000 CFS, ‘all 
states are free to use whatever amount of water they can put to beneficial use,’ 
subject to the requirement that ‘[i]f the states have competing uses and the 
amount of water available in excess of 3000 CFS cannot satisfy all such uses, 
each state will honor the other’s right to 25% of the excess flow.’ … If more 
than 25 percent of subbasin 5’s water is located in Oklahoma, that water is not 
‘unallocated’; rather, it is allocated to Oklahoma unless and until another State 
calls for an accounting and Oklahoma is asked to refrain from utilizing more 
than its entitled share. The Oklahoma water statutes cannot discriminate against 
interstate commerce with respect to unallocated waters because the Compact 
leaves no waters unallocated.” Id.  
 130. Id.  
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Tarrant brings to light the “double-consent” issue. Both the 
district court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals opinions assumed 
that because Congress approved the interstate compact, it 
inherently approved of the compact’s terms, and thus knowingly 
consented to potential dormant Commerce Clause violations. 
Similarly, in Intake Water Company v. Yellowstone River Compact 
Commission,131 the Ninth Circuit found that when Congress 
approved the Yellowstone River Compact, Congress was “acting 
within its authority to immunize state law from some constitutional 
objections by converting it into federal law.”132 The Yellowstone 
River Compact fixes the water usage of all waters of the 
Yellowstone River Basin.133 Intake Water sought to divert water 
from the Yellowstone River Basin, which was outside the 
jurisdiction of the compact; Intake Water Company was unable to 
do so because, under the compact, “No water shall be diverted 
from the Yellowstone River Basin without unanimous consent of 
all the signatory states.”134 Intake Water Company argued that the 
restriction of the diversion of the water was a constitutionally 
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.135 The Ninth Circuit 
found that there could be no question of whether Congress in fact 
approved the state laws at issue because “[t]he Compact was 
before Congress and Congress expressly approved it.”136 Although 
it may certainly be true that Congress did intend to allow the 
compacting states to exclusively control the water in the 
Yellowstone River Basin, it is improper to heedlessly infer such 
congressional consent by simply noting the fact that Congress 
approved the compact itself.  
III. SOLUTION: REVIEWING COURTS SHOULD ADOPT AN 
INTERPRETIVE PRESUMPTION AGAINST AN INTERSTATE COMPACT’S 
INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
Double-dipping is problematic, and courts must employ a 
doctrinal rule to better separate and deal with the two issues. 
Courts must take a more reasoned approach to determining the 
scope of congressional consent. The following interpretive 
presumption proposal would force courts to analyze congressional 
consent more closely in order to ascertain the intended scope. 
                                                                                                             
 131. 769 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 132. Id. at 570. 
 133. Id. at 569. 
 134. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-83, Art. X, 65 Stat. 663, 
(1951) 
 135. Intake, 769 F.2d at 569. 
 136. Id. at 570. 
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As Tarrant and other cases involving the Compact Clause and 
dormant Commerce Clause indicate, it is difficult to determine the 
scope of Congress’s consent to interstate compacts. By their 
nature, interstate compacts tend to have regional focus; member 
states negotiate terms for years and undertake significant research 
efforts to resolve the regional issues at hand. Thus, the question 
becomes whether it is proper to impute an awareness of possible 
dormant Commerce Clause implications to Congress. 
In order to resolve disputes regarding the scope of Congress’s 
consent to interstate compacts, courts should adopt an interpretive 
presumption against interstate commerce discrimination. This 
doctrinal rule would hold that interstate compacts must be 
interpreted narrowly insofar as they relate to activities potentially 
burdensome upon interstate commerce. 
The presumption against interstate commerce discrimination 
will apply whenever an interstate compact is challenged under the 
dormant Commerce Clause. The state claiming congressional 
acquiescence to the regulation must first provide the compact 
language and the proof of congressional consent.  
The reviewing court must, of course, first examine the plain 
language of the compact in order to determine whether Congress 
expressly contemplated the compact to escape dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny. In the event an interstate compact approved by 
Congress contains language directly addressing the dormant 
Commerce Clause, one can hardly take issue with assuming 
Congress contemplated the possible implications. In the absence of 
express language expressing intent to seek congressional 
acquiescence from Congress, the state claiming the exception must 
prove that Congress has, by statute or other means, unambiguously 
ceded to the states its authority over the particular field. 
A. Threshold Matters—Identifying Interstate Compacts and 
Dormant Commerce Clause Violations 
As a preliminary matter, a reviewing court must conclude that 
the agreement at issue is a valid interstate compact under Article I, 
Section 10. The principal inquiry is whether the agreement is 
between two or more states and whether Congress has approved 
the agreement. 
Next, the court should determine whether the regulation at 
issue in the compact constitutes a burden on interstate commerce. 
Recall that the initial question is whether a state law discriminates 
against out-of-staters or treats all alike.137 A regulation may 
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unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce when it 
discriminates against out-of-state individuals on the face of the 
regulation or, in the case of a facially neutral regulation, if the 
discriminatory effects outweigh any in-state advantages. If the 
court identifies a would-be violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, then the court must determine whether Congress sought to 
permit such regulation, thus insulating the regulation from attack.  
Not all interstate agreements require congressional consent. 
However, in order for a state to claim that the agreement at issue is 
shielded from dormant Commerce Clause violations by virtue of 
congressional approval of the agreement itself, the state must 
demonstrate the agreement is a valid interstate compact under 
Article I, Section 10. Thus, those informal interstate agreements, 
which were not created under the Compact Clause and 
unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce, cannot be shielded 
from a dormant Commerce Clause attack because there is no 
congressional involvement from which a reviewing court may infer 
congressional acquiescence to the burdensome condition. 
B. The Interpretive Presumption 
As demonstrated by the district and circuit court opinions in 
Tarrant, courts have yet to develop a consistent standard for 
determining whether incidences of discrimination against interstate 
commerce executed pursuant to a congressionally-approved 
interstate compact are insulated from dormant Commerce Clause 
attack.138 The proper solution to this issue is to clearly separate the 
analyses. Congressional consent to the compact and congressional 
acquiescence to possible dormant Commerce Clause issues are two 
distinct inquiries. A court cannot simply infer the latter from the 
former. This is based on the premise that Congress should not cede 
its power to regulate interstate commerce casually. Thus, courts 
should employ an interpretive presumption against congressional 
acquiescence to dormant Commerce Clause violations contained 
within valid interstate compacts under Article I, Section 10. The 
presumption would be rebuttable; if the party claiming 
congressional acquiescence can provide a concrete, articulated 
expression of Congress’s intent to allow regulation of the particular 
article of commerce in the manner provided by the compact, the 
presumption is rebutted. 
                                                                                                             
 138. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No. CIV–07–0045–HE, 
2009 WL 3922803, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2009); Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. 
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As a practical matter, when consent to an interstate compact 
has been granted in advance of the compact’s creation, or when the 
consent to the compact is merely implied by subsequent 
congressional activity, the state asserting congressional 
acquiescence will likely face more difficulty in meeting the burden 
of proof. An advanced call for negotiation and compacting should 
not be treated as a true and knowing approval of the content of the 
resulting compacts; Congress cannot consent to an agreement that 
does not yet exist. In Cuyler v. Adams,139 the Supreme Court held 
that a 1934 act of Congress constituted the consent required to 
validate a purported interstate compact. The 1934 act, in part, 
provides: “The consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or 
more States to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative 
effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the 
enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies . . . .”140 
In order to resolve the substantive issues involved in Cuyler, the 
Court was required to determine whether the 1934 congressional 
act constituted the required consent under the Compact Clause 
necessary to validate the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the 
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.141 Relevant to the discussion 
here, Justice Rehnquist concluded in his dissent that the legislation 
at issue was a state law “for which the consent of Congress was not 
required under the Constitution, and to which Congress never 
consented at all save in the vaguest terms some 25 years prior to its 
passage . . . .”142 Justice Rehnquist’s reference to “the vaguest 
terms some 25 years prior to its passage” highlights, albeit 
dismissively, a problem inherent in the advanced consent method: 
when the consent is broad, dated, and nonspecific, it becomes less 
clear that Congress intended to consent to the resulting compact. 
The Cuyler case demonstrates the inherent ambiguity surrounding 
many advanced consent compacts, and that they are properly 
mistrusted as demonstrating nothing more than an approval of the 
agreement between states as laid out by the plain text within the 
four corners of the agreement. 
States defending dormant Commerce Clause challenges, in the 
context of an interstate compact impliedly approved by Congress, 
will also have a difficult hurdle to overcome in order to 
demonstrate congressional acquiescence, as it will be difficult to 
point to an expression of congressional intent. States seeking to 
demonstrate implied congressional approval of interstate compacts 
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often cite congressional acts demonstrating acceptance of the 
compact’s terms, such as the adoption of legislation consistent with 
the terms of the compact or ratification of actions by state 
authorities and Congress that are consistent with the purposes of 
the compact.143 A state would not be able to overcome the 
interpretive presumption merely by showing that Congress only 
impliedly consented to the interstate compact at hand, as this 
implicit consent could not sufficiently indicate Congress’s 
acquiescence to any possible dormant Commerce Clause violations. 
The interpretive presumption would prevent such far-removed 
inferences from demonstrating congressional acquiescence. 
Once the reviewing court verifies that the agreement at hand is 
a valid interstate compact under the Constitution, its next task will 
consist of an examination of the language of both the interstate 
compact and Congress’s consent language, if any such language 
exists. Of course, if Congress expressly permits would-be dormant 
Commerce Clause violations, this language would control and 
would extinguish any claims of dormant Commerce Clause 
violations. In order to evince its consent to would-be dormant 
Commerce Clause violations, Congress may use language similar to 
that espoused in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In other words 
Congress, in order to insulate an interstate compact from dormant 
Commerce Clause attack, could include the following expression: 
“Congress hereby permits the member states to this compact to 
regulate the interstate commerce item of, pursuant to these 
congressionally-approved provisions.” Clear language to this effect 
would unambiguously insulate states from dormant Commerce 
Clause attack, while also notifying the states that they must act in 
accord with the provisions of the compact in order for the protection 
to apply. If the state cannot demonstrate such a congressional 
expression, its acquiescence claim will fail, and the state will be 
prohibited from sustaining a regulation in violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. However, a state alleging congressional 
acquiescence to a would-be dormant Commerce Clause violation 
raised by an interstate compact does not need to provide an express 
congressional statement. Because the interpretive presumption is 
rebuttable, a state could conceivably overcome the presumption by 
demonstrating that the compact’s terms were so clear and obvious 
that Congress, pursuant to a reasonable examination, must have 
known of the dormant Commerce Clause implications and, through 
consent of the interstate compact, sought to allow the regulation. 
Consider, for instance, an interstate compact whose unambiguous 
purpose was to implement a scheme which would, on its face, 
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discriminate against interstate commerce. Congressional approval 
of an interstate compact to this effect would necessarily represent 
Congress’s acquiescence to the would-be dormant Commerce 
Clause violation. In other words, if the interstate commerce burden 
is so clear that any simple reading of the text of the interstate 
compact would put Congress on notice of a possible dormant 
Commerce Clause violation, the state would likely be able to 
overcome the presumption. 
IV. APPLICATION—TARRANT REGIONAL WATER DISTRICT V. 
HERRMANN 
To demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed interpretive 
presumption, consider the facts of Tarrant Regional Water District v. 
Herrmann. A reviewing court can easily address and dispose of the 
threshold matters in Tarrant. The Supreme Court has held that water is 
an article of commerce,144 so it is clear that Oklahoma’s moratorium 
on out-of-state water exportation involves a regulation of an article of 
commerce. Next, it is clear that the Red River Compact is a 
congressionally approved compact between two or more states.  
A court must then perform the dormant Commerce Clause 
violation analysis. In this case, Oklahoma’s restrictive water scheme 
discriminates against interstate commerce on its face. A facially 
discriminatory regulation is per se invalid, unless the state can 
demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify the differential 
treatment.145 Oklahoma would have to prove that its moratorium 
policy is supported by a compelling state interest. Tarrant, in its briefs, 
persuasively refuted Oklahoma’s claims that its moratorium exists to 
preserve water in case of a future shortage.146 As a result, a court could 
likely have found that Oklahoma’s water moratorium created an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate water commerce. If a reviewing 
court came to such a conclusion, the next inquiry would necessarily 
entail an examination of the congressional consent language to 
determine whether Congress intended to permit the regulation.  
In order for the court to determine whether the Red River Compact 
demonstrates Congress’s intent to acquiesce to this violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause, it must ascertain which type of consent 
Congress used. In the case of the Red River Compact, Congress first 
                                                                                                             
 144. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982). 
 145. Petragnani, supra note 79, at 1217; see also City of Philadelphia v. New 
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 146. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 
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invited the four states to enter into negotiations in 1955,147 and then, 
Congress consented to the completed Red River Compact’s content in 
1980.148 The interpretive presumption requires that a court assume that 
Congress did not intend to acquiesce to a dormant Commerce Clause 
violation. In order to rebut the presumption, Oklahoma would have to 
show that Congress’s intent was “expressly stated” or “unmistakably 
clear.” 
In regard to existing state policy, the Red River Compact’s most 
instructive provision is section 2.10, which states: “Nothing in this 
Compact shall be deemed to: (a) Interfere with or impair the right or 
power of any Signatory State to regulate within its boundaries the 
appropriation, use, and control of water, or quality of water, not 
inconsistent with its obligations under this Compact.”149 This 
provision seems to suggest that the enactment of the Red River 
Compact did not serve to displace any existing state laws regarding 
water usage within state borders. Employing the proposed interpretive 
presumption, a reviewing court would be required to determine 
whether Congress’s consent to the Red River Compact itself served 
also as congressional acquiescence to the dormant Commerce Clause 
violation raised by the Oklahoma water moratorium statutes, insofar as 
they regulate the usage of water subject to the Red River Compact. 
The proposed interpretive presumption calls for a reasoned and fair 
assessment of Congress’s understanding of the text presented. It would 
be the task of the reviewing court to assess whether Congress truly 
contemplated the dormant Commerce Clause implications implicit 
within section 2.10 and whether Congress intended to allow the 
signatory states to regulate water usage in a way that would otherwise 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Weighing most heavily against 
a finding of congressional acquiescence to the dormant Commerce 
Clause violation is the fact that any language preserving existing or 
future signatory state regulation is sparse and general. In addition, 
                                                                                                             
 147. See Act of Aug. 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-346, 69 Stat. 654 (“Be it 
enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That the consent of Congress is hereby given to 
the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas to negotiate and enter into 
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make a report to the President of the United States and the Congress of the 
proceedings and of any compact entered into. Such compact shall not be binding 
or obligatory upon any of the parties thereto until it shall have been ratified by the 
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United States.”). 
 148. See Red River Compact, supra note 102. 
 149. See id. at 2.10(a).  
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Oklahoma codified its water moratorium in 1992, 12 years after 
ratification of the Red River Compact. A reviewing court may have 
held that, although it is clear that Congress did not intend to 
significantly alter state regulation of Red River water within state 
boundaries, Congress likely did not intend to preserve state water 
moratoriums that unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. 
The interpretive presumption’s most important function would be 
to eliminate double-consent rubber stamping—in other words, by 
employing the interpretive presumption, courts would be unable to 
infer congressional acquiescence to dormant Commerce Clause 
violations by simply noting that Congress approved of the compact 
itself. In Tarrant, Oklahoma would not have been able to simply rely 
on Congress’s approval of the Red River Compact as evidence that 
Congress intended for Oklahoma to impose a burden on interstate 
commerce by way of its corresponding water statutes. Instead, 
Oklahoma would have had to provide more evidence of Congress’s 
intent to allow states to hoard excess water supplies to the detriment of 
states in dire need of the resource. Oklahoma would likely have been 
unable to provide such proof, and Texas would have had an 
opportunity to purchase from Oklahoma the water it desperately 
needed for the rapidly growing Dallas-Fort Worth area. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In order to better preserve our natural resources and ensure even-
handed economic practices between states, while maintaining the 
legitimacy of interstate compacts created pursuant to the Compact 
Clause of the Constitution, courts need to adopt an interpretive 
presumption against burdens on interstate commerce. This 
presumption requires that courts presume that Congress would not 
intend to agree to an interstate compact imposing a burden on 
interstate commerce without expressly conveying such intent. This 
would help eliminate state protectionism from creating unfair burdens 
on sister states, while also preserving states’ rights to enter into 
contracts subject to the approval of Congress and the laws of the 
United States. 
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